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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE SUPREME COURT,
1936 TERM
OSMOND K. FRAENKEL t
The term just ended will probably rank in the history of the Supreme
Court as one of its most important sessions. This is so not only because
of the actual decisions rendered, but also by reason of the influence upon
these decisions of outside forces. As early as the summer of 1936 these
forces began to operate, following the now overruled Minimum Wage deci-
sion. 1 They gained momentum as the election returns registered the great
popular approval of the New Deal policies which the conservative group
in the Court had done so much to thwart. Justice Stone's illness left in
doubt how the Court was reacting to these forces, although the four-to-four
affirmance of New York's Unemployment Insurance case 2 indicated the
imminence of a change from the previous term's conservative predominance.
Confirmation of the trend, however, waited on Justice Stone's recovery and
return. Then, apparently out of a clear sky, came President Roosevelt's
demand for the appointment of additional justices, 3 a demand obviously
motivated by a desire for change in the character of the Court's decisions.
And, whether influenced by the demand or not, the change came. In the
crucial cases it was a change in the attitude of Justice Roberts. For at this
term, in the fourteen 4 cases in which one vote determined the outcome, a
greater number of such decisions than at any other term in the Court's
history,5 Justice Roberts sided with the liberals in every instance but one; 6
t A. B., 19o7, as of 19o8, A. M., 19o8, Harvard University; LL. B., 1911, Columbia Uni-
versity; member of the New York Bar; author of THE SACCO-VANZETTI CASE (1931);
editor, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS (1934);
author, Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court, 1934 Term (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV.
345, Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court, 5935 Term (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 27,
and other articles in legal periodicals.
I. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587 (1936).
2. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 299 U. S. 5,5 (1936), pet. denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 926
(937).
3. For the text of the proposal together with supporting data from the Attorney Gen-
eral, see N. Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1937, p. I, col. 6. For discussion thereof see Mason, Politics
and the Supreme Court: President Roosevelt's Proposal (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 652;
White, Disturbing the Balance (937) id. at 678.
4. There were twelve five-to-four decisions (counting the three N. L. R. B. cases as
one), one four-to-three, and two four-to-four. In one of these last, Railroad Comm. v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 935 (I937), it is not possible to determine how Justice
Roberts voted; in the other, Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 299 U. S. 515 (936), it is a rea-
sonable inference that he voted with the liberals since in the later case dealing with a similar
law he did so: Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 57 Sup. Ct 868 (937).
5. At the 193o term there were six; 1931, three; 1932, three; 1933, eight; 1934, six; 1935,
eleven. See Fraenkel, Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court, 1935 Term (1936) 85 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 27, n. 2; Five-to-Four Decisions of the Supreme Court (1935) 2 U. S. L.
WEEK 1010.
6. Great Northern Ry. v. Washington, 300 U. S. 154 (1937), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 639.
This case is discussed infra pp. 45-46, 6o.
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at the previous term he had sided with the conservatives in six out of ten
such cases.7 In at least two cases 8 of the present term, the change repre-
sented a reversal of position.
The decisions which resulted in this new position of the Court were
all, in one respect or another, labor cases. And they came before it against
a background of extensive and far-reaching labor disputes accompanied by
the growth of the militant C. I. 0. and the development of the novel "sit-
down" technique. It is hardly strange that under such circumstances as
these the Court should have abandoned some of the unrealistic positions it
had taken in the past. That it should so quickly have reversed itself on the
important questions of interstate commerce was, however, a great surprise.
THE TWILIGHT OF "STATES RIGHTS"
Ever since the decision in the Schechter case 9 the literature of the law,
popular as well as learned,10 has been replete with suggestions to the effect
that all would be well if the judges would but see the light and realize that
the framers of the Constitution intended to create a national government
strong enough to function where the states could not. At the 1935 term
the Court heeded none of these admonitions." In the Guffey case 12 the
majority made it clear that the doctrine of states rights existed not only to
protect the states but also to protect private rights in hostility to the ex-
pressed desire 13 of the states concerned. And in the Municipal Bankruptcy
case 14 this doctrine was carried so far as to thwart national action directly
approved by a state legislature. The hampering effects of undue emphasis
on federalism could hardly have gone further.
I. As a consequence of these decisions it was very generally assumed
that the Court would apply a narrow interpretation to the Wagner Act. 15
7. The cases are listed in Fraenkel, supra note 5, 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 27, n. 2.
8. The Minimum Wage and N. L. R. B. cases, discussed infra pp. 40-42, 48-49.
9. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
lo. Among the books and articles published in 1936 are: BRANT, STORM OVER THE CON-
STITUTION; CORWIN, COMMERCE POWER V. STATES RIGHTS; WALLACE, WHOSE CONSTITU-
TION?; Beard, Rendezvous with the Supreme Court, 88 NEw REPUBLIC 92; Brabner-Smith,
Congress v. Supreme Court-A Constitutional Amendment.?, 22 VA. L. REV. 665; Collier,
The Expanding Meaning of the Constitution, Ii Wis. L. REV. 323; Dodd, Adjustment of the
Constitution to New Needs, 22 A. B. A. J. 126; Garrison, The Constitution and Social Prog-
ress, 1o TULANE L. REv. 333; Haines, Judicial Review of Acts of Congress and the Need for
Constitutional Reform, 45 YALE L. J. 816; McBain, Some Aspects of Judicial Review, 16 B.
U. L. REV. 525; Perrigo, Proposals to Restrict Judicial Nullification of Statutes, 8 ROCKY
MT. L. REv. 161.
And in 1937: ERNST, THE ULTIMATE POWER; RIBBLE, STATE & NATIONAL PoWER ovER
COMMERCE; Powell, The Next Four Years: The Constitution, 89 NEw REPUBLIC 317.
Ii. The more expert critiques, to be sure, had not then been published. See, for example,
CoRwin, op. cit. supra note 10.
12. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
13. By filing briefs as amici curiae in support of the law. See N. Y. Times, March ui,
1936, p. IS, col. 5; March 13, p. 5, col. 2.
14. Ashton v. Cameron Co. Water Imp. Dist., 298 U. S. 513 (1936), 85 U. OF PA. L.
REv. III.
15. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 49 STAT. 449 (935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq.
(Supp. 1936).
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While that statute by its terms applied only to commerce between the states
and with foreign nations, the Labor Board had sought to invoke it against
manufacturing plants whose activities crossed state borders. The Circuit
Courts of Appeals of several circuits, including the second, which had de-
cided for the government in the Schechter case,
16 ruled against the Board 17
on the general proposition that manufacturing, like mining and agriculture,
was local. For this conclusion certain words of Justice Sutherland in the
Guffey case seemed complete authority.18 And not only Justice Roberts
but also the Chief Justice had expressed no disagreement with that language.
But a year brought changes. In the National Labor Relations Act
cases 19 the Chief Justice, writing for the majority, brushed aside the Guffey
decision by the statement that the law there involved was invalid on several
grounds, such as improper delegation and deprivation of due process. The
Schechter case was distinguished because the evils there involved had but a
remote effect on interstate commerce. The Court considered the facts in
each of the cases before it and found that a strike due to the refusal of the
employer to bargain collectively with his employees would have a "most
serious effect upon interstate commerce". 20 The Chief Justice stated that
the judges refused to shut their eyes "to the plainest facts of our national
life and to deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in an in-
tellectual vacuum." 21 He said further:
"When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making
their relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their ac-
tivities, how can it be maintained that their industrial labor relations
constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not enter when
it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing con-
sequences of industrial war? We have often said that interstate com-
merce itself is a practical conception. It is equally true that interfer-
ences with that commerce must be appraised by a judgmient that does
not ignore actual experience.
16. United States v. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
17. National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 83 F. (2d) 998 (C. C. A.
5th, 1936) ; National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 85 F. (2d) I
(C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ; Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 85 F. (2d) 391 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1936) ; Foster Bros. Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 85 F. (2d) 984 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1936).
18. See 298 U. S. 238, 304 (936), where he described all the elements of the labor rela-
tion, including collective bargaining, as incidents of production, not of trade.
19. National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. I (1937) ; Na-
tional Labor Rel. Bd. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49 (937) ; National Labor Rel.
Bd. v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58 (937), 85 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 733,
37 COL. L. REv. 86o. See Notes (1937) 37 COL. L. Rav. 816, 32 ILL. L. REv. 196; Legis.
(1936) 22 CORN. L. Q. 151. See also Garrison, Government and Labor: The Latest Phase
(1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 897; Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence upon the Devel-
opment of Collective Bargaining (1937) 5o HARV. L. REV. 1071.
2o. National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. I, 41 (1937).
21. Ibid.
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"Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of
the right of employees to self-organization and to have representatives
of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often
an essential condition of industrial peace. Refusal to confer and
negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife. This is
such an outstanding fact in the history of labor disturbances that it is
a proper subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of in-
stances." 22
In the Jones & Laughlin 23 case the problem was relatively simple.
Here was an industry which owned mines in states other than Pennsylvania
where its plant was located. It owned railroads and steamships engaged in
interstate commerce; it shipped its products to its own warehouses in several
states and owned agencies for the distribution and sale of its products
throughout the country and in Canada. If ever a manufacturing plant
might be said to be engaged in interstate commerce, clearly this was such a
one. The company had argued that its transactions did not constitute a
"flow ofccommerce", 24 inasmuch as the changes in the raw material which
took place at the plant were very extensive. The Court found it unneces-
sary to consider this contention since Congressional power did not depend
upon the existence of such a flow.
In the Fruehauf Trailer 25 case the facts were similar to those in the
Jones & Laughlin case, except that in this instance the raw materials did not
come from company-owned mines. The Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing
Co. 2 6 case presented a different problem. This was not a nationally or-
ganized concern, one predominant in its field. Yet the bulk of the raw
materials it used as well as that of the product it made crossed state lines,
and the concern maintained a sales office in New York. The majority of
the Court did not discuss any arguments founded upon the particular facts
of that case. But the minority used these facts as the text of its dissent.
Justice McReynolds pointed out that the clothing firm employed only eight
hundred persons and conducted less than one-half of one per cent of the
transactions in the industry. Were it tb close, he said, the effect on inter-
state commerce "obviously would be negligible".2 7 Yet in the Guffey case
Justice Sutherland had held that the fact that the effect might be tremendous
was immaterial.2 8 The minority emphasized also the smallness of the num-
ber of employees who wanted to join the union and doubted whether per-
22. Ibid.
23. 301 U. S. 1 (1937). 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 733. For discussion of the due process
and civil liberties aspects of this case, see infra notes IOI, 211.
24. This phrase is taken verbatim from the Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 151
(Supp. 1936). See also 301 U. S. at 7.
25. 301 U. S. 49 (1937).
26. 301 U. S. 58 (1937).
27. 301 U. S. at 87.
28. See 298 U. S. 238, 3o9 (1936).
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sistence by the employer in his discriminatory practices would have any
effect whatever on interstate commerce.
The increase in federal power which the Court has thus established
has been widely hailed. Even conservative circles see authority in the deci-
sions for Congressional restriction on union activities such as the sit-down
strike. Just how far-reaching the decisions actually are will, of course,
have to await a more precise definition of the line beyond which Congress
may not go in regulating manufacturing plants. Exactly what percentage
of raw material and finished product must cross state lines in order that
the plant be brought within the scope of the commerce clause is not yet
clear. Further litigation will also result from the creation of labor boards
in various states.29 We are likely to see industry claiming to be interstate
when local boards seek to regulate its labor relations and taking the opposite
stand as to its status when the federal board takes action. It would be
desirable for Congress expressly to authorize the local board to act in those
instances in which it comes upon the scene first.30
2. Two other labor cases presented interstate commerce questions dur-
ing this term. In the Associated Press case "' the employer insisted that it
was not engaged in commerce at all so far as its editorial staff in New York
was concerned, on the theory that the news was there "manufactured". The
Court rejected this fanciful argument, pointing out that the operations of
the Press involved the constant use of channels of interstate communication.
The minority discussed only the issue of freedom of the press, which will
be considered hereafter.
In the Virginia Railway case 3 2 the employer argued that employees of
a repair shop were not engaged in interstate commerce. The Court unani-
mously held otherwise, on the ground that 97o of the road's business was
interstate and that a strike in the repair shops would cripple its business.
It was no answer, said Justice Stone, that the company might close its shops
and have the work done elsewhere. So long as it maintained the shops the
road was subject to the provisions of the law.
3. In three cases the Court approved the use of federal power in co-
operation with state legislation. The most far-reaching of these are the
two cases dealing with the Social Security Act.33 In Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis 34 the unemployment insurance features 35 were approved, and in
29. Mass. Laws 1937, c. 436; N. Y. Laws 1937, C. 443; Pa. Laws 1937, no. 294; Utah
Laws 1937, c. 55; Wis. Laws 1937, c. 51.
30. See Garrison, supra note 19.
31. Associated Press v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 301 U. S. 103 (937). For discussion
of the civil liberties features of this case, see infra p. 65.
32. Virginia Ry. v. System Fed. No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 (1937). For discussion of due
process in connection with this case, see infra pp. 50-51.
33. 49 STAT. 620 (I935), 42 U. S. C. A. § 301 et seq. (Supp. 1936).
34. 57 Sup. Ct. 883 (937).
35. Title IX, 49 STAT. 639 (I935), 42 U. S. C. A. § Iioi et seq. (Supp. 1936).
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Helvering v. Davis,8 the old age pensions.3 7 Justices McReynolds, Suther-
land and Butler wrote separate dissenting opinions in the first case, Justice
Van Devanter agreeing with that of Justice Sutherland. In the second,
Justices McReynolds and Butler contented themselves with the brief state-
ment that the law violated the Tenth Amendment. This was, of course,
the crucial question. Did these laws invade the reserved powers of the
states? Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority in both cases, laid down
the broad principles that Congress might levy an excise tax on any occupa-
tion or relationship to the same extent as might the states, and that these
taxes were for the general welfare and were free from entanglements such
as had invalidated the AAA.
In the Steward Machine Co. case the attack was based primarily upon
the 9o% credit for payments to an approved state fund,3 8 on the ground
that this involved coercion upon the states. In considering that question
Justice Cardozo recited the facts regarding unemployment, emphasizing the
national character of the problem and the necessity for the expenditure of
federal funds for relief. The Federal Government, he said, has the right
to plan to lessen evils such as these in the future. The enactment of this
law was a spur to the states, not because of any compulsion, but because
it relieved each state of the fear that, if it acted and other states did not
act, it might find itself at a disadvantage. He commented on the fact that
the state there concerned (Alabama) was not complaining of the law, indeed
"would be sorely disappointed if it were now to be annulled". 39 The peti-
tioner, he held, confused motive with coercion. Nothing amounting to
undue influence was apparent in the case.
In upholding the law the majority expressly left many questions open,
especially whether Congress might permit a state to escape a tax by adop-
tion of a law having no relation to national policy, such as was the Child
Labor tax.
40
The dissenting justices believed that the administrative provisions,
especially those which compelled deposit of funds with the United States
Treasury and limited their withdrawal, were so great an encroachment on
state sovereignty as to destroy the entire law. In their opinion the law
did not permit withdrawal of the moneys deposited, except for the purposes
of unemployment insurance. And Justice Sutherland found this to be de-
structive of the federal system, saying that the purpose of the Constitution
in erecting that system could be "thwarted no more by voluntary surrender
36. 57 Sup. Ct. 904.
37. Title II, 49 STAT. 622 (935), 42 U. S. C. A. §401 et seq. (Supp. 1936).
38. 49 STAT. 639, §902 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. § 1102 (Supp. 1936).
39. 57 Sup. Ct. at 892.
40. 40 STAT. 1138 (I919), held unconstitutional in the Child Labor Tax case, 259 U. S.
20 (1922).
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from within than by invasion from without." 41 In answer to this argu-
ment Justice Cardozo intimated that the moneys could be freely withdrawn,
but said that the decision would be the same if the law created a contract
not to do so, since states could validly contract for benefits received.
The dissent of Justice McReynolds consisted principally of a long
quotation 42 from a message of President Pierce, written in 1854 upon his
veto of a bill granting public lands to the states for the benefit of indigent
insane persons. The message took the broad position that an appropriation
of money for relief purposes was unconstitutional. Justice McReynolds
believed the legislation under consideration to be the first step in a process
which would imperil the independence of the states and destroy the federalp
plan of government.
43
In Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central Ry.44 the Court
unanimously extended the principle it had announced at the preceding term
in Whitfield v. Ohio.45 In the latter case the Court had approved a state
law 46 which forbade the sale of goods manufactured by convict labor even
though such goods were manufactured in another state, thus recognizing
the doctrine of "economic harm". Now the Court approved complementary
federal legislation forbidding transportation into any state of such mer-
chandise, provided the state law forbade its sale there. The argument that
regulation was forbidden if the articles transported were inherently harm-
less was rejected. The Chief Justice pointed out that the laws with regard
to liquor rested not on the illegitimacy of the subject but on the harm which
might flow from its use, a consideration which enabled the states, even be-
fore the Eighteenth Amendment, to prohibit its sale. The Child Labor
case 47 was distinguished on the ground that Congress was there attempting
to regulate commerce not in aid of state policy but rather with a view to
imposing upon the states its own policy.
The possibility that legislation of the kind now approved by these two
decisions might be used to stop child labor by the closing of profitable mar-
kets to its products has been much discussed. 48 Such legislation failed of
41. 57 Sup. Ct. at 903.
42. Id. at 896. Justice Butler agreed with the dissenting opinions of both Justice Suther-
land and Justice McReynolds.
43. In the Helvering case there were no additional problems. The only question was
whether an expenditure for old age pensions was for the general welfare. Recognizing the
wide discretion which must be given to Congress, the majority could see no ground on which
to hold the power lacking. For a full treatment see Lowndes, The Supreme Court on Taxa-
tion, 1936 Tern (937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv.
44. 299 U. S. 334 (936), 85 U. oF PA. L. REv. 529 (1937), 37 COL. L. REv. 648.
45. 297 U. S. 431 (1936).
46. OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's Baldwin, 1934) §§ 2228-1, 2228-2.
47. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (918).
48. See Chambliss, Constitutional Code Control (1936) 30 ILL. L. REV. 829; Corwin,
National and State Cooperation-Its Present Possibilities (937) 46 YALE L. J. 599; Fraen-
kel, The Constitution and the Supreme Court (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 212, 213; Powell,
Commerce, Pensions and Codes II (935) 49 HARV. L. REv. 193, 231-34; Ribble, National
and State Cooperation Under the Commerce Clause (1937) 37 COL. L. REV. 43.
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passage in the last Congress, 49 although that body did pass a lav -0 applying
the principle to goods shipped in violation of state Fair Trade laws.
4. Finally, there are two tax cases. In Sonzinsky v. United States 51
the Court upheld the National Firearms Act 52 which imposed a tax on all
dealers and importers of firearms and on each sale made by them. The law
was attacked as an attempt to regulate an industry essentially local in char-
acter. Justice Stone asserted that in the case before the Court nothing in
the law indicated an intention by Congress to regulate the industry, and the
fact that the tax would have such result did not make it void, since "Every
tax is in some measure regulatory" .
53
In Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States 54 a processing tax on coconut
oil, the proceeds of which, insofar as levied on Philippine oil, were paid
into the Philippine treasury, was unanimously upheld. The AAA case was
distinguished because the law was in no way regulatory of the industry,
and the grant to the Philippines was declared to be a purpose within the
general welfare clause.
5. While thus extending the power of the central government, the
Court has, with one exception, maintained a due regard for state activity
when challenged by private interests. That exception, Great Northern Ry.
v. Washington,55 was a five-to-four decision. The case involved a statute 56
imposing fees on all public utilities, based on a percentage of their gross
income. The law required the fees to be used for administering the public
service commission law. The railroad company objected to the fee it was
required to pay on the ground that it was used to meet all the expenses of
the commission, not merely the costs of supervising railroads. It contended
that the fees were excessive and thus constituted a burden on its interstate
commerce.
The Court concluded that the law was not bad upon its face, but that
on the authority of Foote & Co. v. Stanley 57 the burden lay on the state to
49. It passed the Senate, 8I CoNG. REc., Aug. 19, 1937, at 11987, but not the House,
where it was merely referred to the Committee on Labor, 8s CONG. REC., Aug. 20, 1937, at
12193.
5o. This was a rider to the District of Columbia tax bill, Pub. L. No. 314, 75th Cong.,
ist Sess. (Aug. 17, 1937) § 69o.
51. 300 U. S. 5o6 (1937).
52. 48 STAT. 1237 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1132a (1934).
53. 300 U. S. at 513.
54. 301 U. S. 308 (1937). For treatment of this case in connection with delegation of
powers, see infra note 223.
55. 300 U. S. 154 (937), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 639, 46 YALE L. J. 1251.
56. 1I WAsH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1933) 88 10417, 10418.
57. 232 U. S. 494 (1914). In that case a fee for inspecting oysters had been held ex-
cessive because it was used to defray other expenses which had nothing to do with the inspec-
tion. The minority in the Great Northern case believed the decision to be inapplicable
because the fees were charged only on the importation of oysters, thus bringing the case
within an express provision of the Constitution. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § IO, cl. 2.
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justify the amount charged. Although the Supreme Court of Washington
had considered that burden sufficiently carried,58 the majority now disagreed
with this ruling, chiefly because the witness for the state had relied on
insufficient data. They pointed out that when a constitutional question
was at issue the Supreme Court would examine the facts to determine
whether the conclusions of the state court were justified, citing as a recent
instance of that practice the second Scottsboro decision.59 The minority,
while not questioning the right of the Court to examine the facts, stated that
it was not enough to show that some of the amounts charged against the
railroads were improperly so charged, without proof as to how these charges
affected the excess of charges over receipts. The essential difference be-
tween the judges was, therefore, that the majority believed the burden was
on the state to show that the improper items did not cast the balance in the
railroad's favor, while the minority felt that if the railroad thought such
would be the result, it should have explored the matter at the trial. The
latter view appears to be more in accord with common sense.
In only one of the remaining cases did the Court rule against the state.
That case, Ingels v. Morf,60 involved California's so-called "Caravan
Act",61 which imposed a tax upon every automobile brought into the state
for purposes of resale. The Court unanimously upheld findings 62 of a
three judge court to the effect that the fees charged were a burden on inter-
state commerce because greatly in excess of the cost of policing the traffic
for which they were ostensibly imposed. The decision in Morf v. Binga-
man," handed down at the previous term, was distinguished because the
New Mexico law " there under consideration provided that the fees should
go toward highway maintenance and the car owner had not shown them
to have been excessive. It is difficult to see much substance in the distinc-
tion insofar as it rests on the form of the statute: to the car owner it makes
no difference into which pocket the legislature puts the fees. However,
Justice Stone left the door open by indicating that the legislature might
appropriate the fees for highway purposes. 65 Presumably the hint will be
taken and we shall have more litigation on the subject, since in both of these
cases the Supreme Court refused to pass upon the owner's contention that a
state could not impose a fee upon a single car merely because it was to be
sold.
58. See 184 Wash. 648, 52 P. (2d) 1274 (1935).
59. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935).
6o. 3oo U. S. 290 (1937).
61. CAL. CODES, LAws AND CONSTL. AmEND. (Deering, Supp. 1935) Act 5136.
62. Mof v. Ingels, 14 F. Supp. 922 (S. D. Cal. 1936) (Yankwich, J., dissenting).
63. 298 U. S. 407 (1936).
64. N. M. Laws 1935, c. 56.
65. See 300 U. S. 290, 295 (1937).
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The Court approved 06 a tax imposed by California 17 on the privilege
of importing beer, but only on the ground that this interference with inter-
state commerce was sanctioned by the Twenty-first Amendment, which pro-
hibits transportation of liquor into a state in violation of its laws. 68 Justice
Brandeis made the interesting comment that a state might create a monopoly
in the liquor trade.69
Virginia's Milk Law 70 was held 71 by Justice Cardozo not to interfere
with interstate commerce, since there was no attempt to regulate the price
paid outside the state, but only the price at which the milk might be sold
after it had been brought into the state. In this respect the Virginia law
differed from the New York law 72 condemned at the 1934 term.
73
A somewhat similar problem was presented in Henneford v. Silas
Mason Co.74 Washington imposed a tax 75 on all retail sales and one equal
in amount on all articles used, excepting from it those articles for which
either the retail sales tax or an equivalent tax elsewhere had been paid, and
also all articles not bought at retail. This had the effect of taxing all goods
bought in other states which imposed no sales tax and was therefore chal-
lenged as a burden on interstate commerce. The Court upheld the tax on
the ground that it sought not discrimination against outside purchases but
equality with domestic ones. Justice Cardozo intimated that it might not
be essential to the validity of such a tax that the state exempt transactions
also taxed elsewhere:
"A state, for many purposes, is to be reckoned as a self-contained
unit, which may frame its own system of burdens and exemptions with-
66. State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 (936), 37 COL. L.
REV. 307, 5o HARv. L. REV. 353, 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 322 (1937).
67. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL ACr, CAL. CODES, LAWS AND CONSTL. AMEND. (Deer-
ing, Supp. 1935) Act 3796.
68. The court also approved a Maine law, Me. Laws 1935, c. 104, which required the
registration of all the cosmetics sold in the state, on the ground that the fees were not shown
to be excessive and that there was no discrimination against outside products. Bourjois, Inc.
v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183 (1937). Again it upheld the right of Georgia to regulate the charges
made by tobacco warehousemen, Ga. Laws 1935, no. 343, p. 476, because Congress had not
entered the field and it was one which did not require uniformity of regulation throughout
the country. Townsend v. Yeomans, 57 Sup. Ct. 842 (937). And it further upheld a fran-
chise tax, ALA. GEN. AcTs (1927) § 54, upon the capital of a foreign corporation actually
employed in Alabama. Southern Nat. Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U. S. 148 (937).
69. 299 U. S. at 63.
70. Va. Acts 1934, c. 357.
71. Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 6o8 (1937). In this case Justices Van
Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler dissented only from the holding, approving
the fixing of maximum and minimum prices and relying on their dissent in Nebbia v. New
York. See 291 U. S. 502, 539-559 (1934).
72. N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1935) c. I, § 258-m (4).
73. Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U S. 511 (935).
74. 300 U. S. 577 (I937), 36 COL. L. REV. 1179 (936).
75. Wash. Laws 1935, c. 18, tit. 4.
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out heeding systems elsewhere. If there are limits to that power, there
is no need to mark them now." 76
A HUMANIZED DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
I. At the 1935 term the Court had declared '7 New York's Minimum
Wage law 78 void, since it was like the law previously declared unconstitu-
tional in the Adkins case "I and since the state had not sought reconsidera-
tion of the doctrine of that case. The Court at this term refused 80 the
state's plea for a reargument at which the broader issue might be presented.
But when the identical question came up later on appeal from Washington,
decision was postponed SI until such time as the return of justice Stone
permitted consideration by the full Court. Then Justice Roberts changed
to the liberal side. From the decision then reached in West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish 82 a new conception of the due process clause should result.
The opinion of the Chief Justice attacked the problem directly and
completely. The Adkins case was expressly overruled.s3  Justice Hughes
defined the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, carefully noting that
freedom of contract is not there written:
"It [the Constitution] speaks of liberty and prohibits the depriva-
tion of liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that depriva-
tion the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable
liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation.
But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which
requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the health,
safety, morals and welfare of the people." 84
The Chief Justice pointed to many instances of restrictions on freedom of
contract, drawing freely from the dissents in the Adkins and Morehead cases.
He emphasized the right of the state to legislate in favor of women whose
bargaining power was relatively weak, saying that such action cannot be
regarded as arbitrary or capricious and is therefore a matter as to the wis-
dom of which the legislature is entitled to judge. He went on to state that
76. 300 U. S. 577, 587 (1937). Justice Cardozo met the argument that this tax created
a "tariff" in violation of the doctrine of Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 51 (1935), by pointing
out the ineptitude of labels. It is submitted that there is here no real analogy to a tariff, since
the tax in question was imposed solely to equalize a tax locally imposed. A tariff is always
discriminatory against foreign articles.
77. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587 (1936).
78. N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1935) c. 32, § 550.
79. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
8o. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 299 U. S. 619 (1936).
81. The argument took place on December 16 and 17, 1936; decision was rendered March
29, 1937.
82. 300 U. S. 379 (937), 22 CORN. L. Q. 613, 46 YALE L. J. 1227. For discussion of
the state court opinion, 185 Wash. 581, 55 P. (2d) 1083 (1936), see (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 117.
83. 300 U. S. at 400.
84. Id. at 391.
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the law might be upheld because it prevented underpaid workers from be-
coming charges on the community: "The community is not bound to provide
what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers. The community
may direct its law-making power to correct the abuse which springs from
their selfish disregard of the public interest." 85
In dissent Justice Sutherland repeated what had been said in the earlier
cases. He nevertheless felt constrained to write a brief essay on the
processes followed by judges when declaring laws unconstitutional, in the
course of which he answered Justice Stone's remarks 86 in his dissent in the
AAA case on the subject of judicial self-restraint. He insisted that each
judge must determine for himself whether a challenged law is void beyond
reasonable doubt and should not relinquish his doubts out of deference to
the views of his colleagues. 7 He contended further that no question of
the "self-restraint" of judges was here involved: "Self-restraint belongs in
the domain of will and not of judgment." 81 While recognizing the value
of dissenting opinions, he remarked that the language of these should not
"impugn the good faith of those who think otherwise". 89 On the merits,
he pleaded that the meaning of the Constitution "not change with the ebb
and flow of economic events". 90 The Constitution, he maintained, must
be interpreted now as it would have been interpreted when written. If, in
consequence, something desired is forbidden, the remedy is for the people to
amend the document, not for the judges to rewrite it. The minority quoted
with approval and with emphasis the declaration of Judge Cooley that the
courts must interpret the Constitution "as written".9 1 They then argued
that, since liberty includes liberty to contract, inclusive of contracts of em-
ployment, and since liberty of contract is the rule and restraint the excep-
tion, therefore minimum wage legislation constituted an improper exception.
Justice Sutherland was at some pains to note the distinction between the
regulation of hours, which left the employer free to fix a compensating
wage, and legislation of the type then before the Court, which left the em-
ployer without freedom. But as Justice Holmes pointed out 92 long ago,
the employer is free not to employ anyone under the prohibited wage.
93
85. Id. at 399.
86. See United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 78 (x935).
87. "And in passing upon the validity of a statute, he discharges a duty imposed upon
him, which cannot be consummated justly by an automatic acceptance of the views of others
which have neither convinced, nor created a reasonable doubt in, his mind. If upon a ques-
tion so important he thus surrender his deliberate judgment, he stands forsworn. He cannot
subordinate his convictions to that extent and keep faith with his oath or retain his judicial
and moral independence." 300 U. S. at 4oi.
88. 300 U. S. at 402.
89. Ibid.
go. Ibid.
gi. Id. at 404, quoting from CooLEY, CONSTTUTMoNAL LiMiTATioNs (8th ed. 1927) 124.
92. Dissenting in the Adkins case. See 261 U. S. 525, 570.
93. Discussion of this case under the equal protection clause will be found infra at note
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The decision of the majority was widely hailed. 94  It is hoped that it
will be followed without further relapses such as those which occurred
after Muller v. Oregon 91 was thought to have disposed of Lochner v. New
York.9 6
2. On the day when it handed down the Minimum Wage decision the
Court also settled another question of great importance to labor. In Vir-
ginia Ry. v. System Federation No. 40 97 the problem was whether the
Railway Labor Act 98 violated due process in compelling a carrier to nego-
tiate with representatives of the majority of its employees. The Court
unanimously upheld the law. Justice Stone recapitulated the history of
Congressional efforts to minimize labor disputes in the transportation indus-
try. He held that, in the light of this history, the law demanded that the
employer make reasonable efforts to negotiate with the representatives
chosen by the majority. But he concluded that, although the employer
might not negotiate with representatives of any minority group, he was not
forbidden to make contracts with individual employees.
So construed, the Court held that the law violated no requirements of
due process. The means were appropriate to the ends; no rights of the
railroad company were infringed. The argument that rights of workers
might be affected was answered by the statement that the company could
not complain of the infringement of any immunities of its employees. Jus-
tice Stone was nevertheless careful to point out that the decision was not in
conflict with the two Yellow Dog Contract cases,99 since the law did not
interfere with the normal right of the employer to hire or fire.
This decision, of course, foreshadowed the approval of similar provi-
sions of the National Labor Relations Act.100 And in the Jones &
Laughlin case 101 the Chief Justice briefly stated that the right of the en-
ployer to conduct his business was subject to the correlative right of em-
ployees to organize and bargain collectively: "Restraint for the purpose of
preventing an unjust interference with that right cannot be considered
arbitrary or capricious." 102 He noted further:
"The employer may not, under cover of that right, intimidate or
coerce its employees with respect to their self-organization and repre-
94. See N. Y. Times, March 30, 1937, P. 22, col. I.
95. 208 U. S. 412 (19o8).
96. 198 U. S. 45 (,9o5).
97. 300 U. S. 515 (1937). Treatment of the interstate commerce aspect of this case will
be found supra note 32.
98. 48 STAT. 1185 (1933), 45 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1936).
99. Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (i9o8) ; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. i
(1915). See Fraenkel, Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and Yellow Dog Con-
tracts (1936) 30 ILL. L. Rxv. 854.
IOO. For citation of the act and discussion of the cases involved thereunder, see supra
note 15 and pp. 39-42.
101. 301 U. S. i (1937). See infra note 211 for the civil liberties features of this case.
lO2. Id. at 41.
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sentation, and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled to make its
authority a pretext for interference with the right of discharge when
that right is exercised for other reasons than such intimidation and
coercion. The true purpose is the subject of investigation with full
opportunity to show the facts. It would seem that when employers
freely recognize the right of their employees to their own organizations
and their unrestricted right of representation there will be much less
occasion for controversy in respect to the free and appropriate exercise
of the right of selection and discharge." 103
The contention that the law was one-sided since it did not deal with
abuses on the part of employees went, said Justice Hughes, to the wisdom
of Congress in passing the law, not to its power to do so. The majority
also upheld the various procedural provisions of the law since they afforded
adequate opportunity to question arbitrary action. It found nothing wrong
with the provision that the findings of the Board on the facts were to be
conclusive: this did not differ from the laws affecting many other adminis-
trative agencies. Therefore, the Court upheld an order requiring the com-
pany to reinstate employees whom the Board found to have been discharged
because of union activities.
Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler dissented
on this point as well as on the interstate commerce point already reviewed.
10 4
Justice McReynolds asserted that Congress had more power to deal with
railroads than with industry. This explains his concurrence in the Virginia
Railway case decided the previous week and in the Washington Coach
case 105 decided that day.
3. The next group of cases involved various forms of social security
legislation. As has already been noted, 10 6 the Court upheld the New York
unemployment insurance law 107 without opinion, by an evenly divided vote.
Later a similar Alabama statute'108 was held valid in Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co.'0 9 by a five-to-four decision. Justice Stone wrote for the
majority and Justice Sutherland for the minority. The latter conceded to
the states the right to deal with the relief of unemployment, but contended
that the law under review violated the due process clause because it per-
mitted pooling of the contributions made by different employers. 110 In
reply to such contention Justice Stone said:
io3. Id. at 45.
io4. See supra note 23.
1O5. Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 301 U. S. i42
(1937).
io6. See supra note 2.
107. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 468.
io8. ALA. CODE ANx. (Supp. 1936) § 7597.
109. 57 Sup. Ct. 868 (937).
1io. Justice Sutherland approved the Wisconsin plan, under which benefits are paid from
each employer's account and only to his own former employees, thus permitting particular
employees to build up reserves and obtain rate reductions.
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"The Court has repudiated the suggestion, whenever made, that
the Constitution requires the benefits derived from the expenditure of
public moneys to be apportioned to the burdens of the taxpayer, or that
he can resist the payment of the tax because it is not expended for
purposes which are peculiarly beneficial to him. . . . Many believe
that the responsibility for the business cycle, the chief cause of unem-
ployment, cannot be apportioned to individual employers in accordance
with their employment experience; that a business may be least re-
sponsible for the depression from which it suffers most." 111
4. One other important labor decision was handed down. In Senn v.
Tile Layers Protective Union," 2 by another five-to-four vote, the Court up-
held Wisconsin's anti-injunction statute." 3 The case was peculiar. Plain-
tiff was the owner of a small contracting concern in which he employed three
or four persons. He was willing to make a contract with the tile layers'
union provided they would allow him to work as a tile layer in spite of a
union rule which forbade contractors do such work themselves. The union
refused to waive its rule and plaintiff thereupon refused to sign up. A
strike ensued, accompanied by peaceful picketing. The pickets carried signs
stating that plaintiff was "unfair" to the union. The state courts 114 re-
fused an injunction and ruled that the situation was controlled by a state
law which expressly permitted peaceful picketing. The employer claimed
a constitutional right to work with his own hands, with which right no
union could interfere by picketing, and that any statute which permitted
such interference deprived him of liberty without due process of law.
With this contention the minority agreed. Justice Butler rested his
argument on the following premise: "Our decisions have made it everywhere
known that these provisions forbid state action which would take from the
individual the right to engage in common occupations of life, and that they
assure equality of opportunity to all under like circumstances." 115 He ad-
mitted that the employer's right to conduct his business was subject to the
employees' right to strike and picket peacefully, but only if the object of
the strike was lawful. In the instant case he contended that the object was
unlawful because the union sought only to compel plaintiff to quit work.
He rejected the contention that the union had an interest in plaintiff's work
because he was in effect a competitor, describing that interest as too remote.
He maintained also that the picketing was unlawful because the signs mis-
represented the facts, there being no basis in truth for the charge of unfair-
ness. In conclusion he said that the decision of the state court violated the
M11. 57 Sup. Ct. at 879.
112. 57 Sup. Ct. 857 (937).
113. Wis. STAT. (1931) §268.23.
114. For discussion of the opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 222 Wis. 383, 268
N. W. 270 (1936), see (937) 46 YALE L. J. lo64.
115. 57 Sup. Ct. at 865.
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fundamental principle "that no man may be compelled to hold his life or
the means of living at the mere will of others." 116
For the majority, Justice Brandeis disputed the contention that the
sign misrepresented the facts and insisted that the end sought by the union
was lawful. The evidence justified the finding of the state court that the
union's rule was reasonable in the light of conditions in the industry. All
that the picketing accomplished was to lessen plaintiff's opportunity to obtain
jobs; it did not prevent his working. And, said Justice Brandeis, "A hoped-
for job is not property guaranteed by the Constitution. And the diversion
of it to a competitor is not an invasion of a constitutional right." 117 He
distinguished Truax v. Corrigan,118 relied on by the plaintiff, on the ground
that the acts complained of in that case were libelous and abusive and thus
clearly wrongful. 119
5. In Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp.'20
the Court upheld fair trade practice laws, and, somewhat unexpectedly, did
so unanimously. These laws permit a manufacturer to fix the retail price
of branded articles and to prevent any one from selling them at a lower
price while having knowledge of the price fixed, even if such person was
not a party to any agreement fixing the price.' 2 ' Justice Sutherland de-
clared that the rule against price fixing had to do only with legislative price
fixing. The objection to price fixing by private agreement was merely that
it promoted monopoly, and if in certain circumstances the legislature author-
ized private price fixing, there was no constitutional barrier. Nor was the
law unconstitutional because it presented a remedy for knowingly violating
the manufacturer's right in his good will. This decision rests upon the
fact that the law is confined to articles bearing brands or trade-marks, ar-
ticles in which the manufacturer in effect retains some property interest.
The Court held that any one who bought such merchandise, knowing of
the restriction, assented to it and could be sued if he violated it. It assumed
that the law would be enforced only against persons who had bought the
property with knowledge of the fixed price, although the law itself is not so
limited. It further asserted that the goods could be sold free of restriction
if the mark or brand were removed and not utilized to bring about the sale.
Finally, Justice Sutherland adverted to the body of opinion tending to show
1i6. Id. at 868.
117. Id. at 864.
118. 257 U. S. 312 (1921).
ix9. For separate treatment of the equal protection features of the Senn case, see infra
p. 6o.
120. 299 U. S. 183 (936). See also Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U. S. 198 (1936)
[involving CAL. GEN. LAWvs (Deering, 1931) Act 8782]. The New York Court of Appeals
reversed itself after these decisions: Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E.
(2d) 30 (937), overriding Doubleday, Doran Co. v. Macy Co., 269 N. Y. 272, igg N. E.
409 (1936).
121. See, for example, Ill. Laws 1935, P. 1436, the statute involved in the instant case.
See also Legis. (1937) 22 CORN. L. Q. 445; Note (937) 5o HAav. L. REv. 667.
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the injurious effect of price cutting not only on the trade but also on the
general public; that this was controverted, he maintained, was immaterial,
since the existence of controversy permitted choice by the legislature.
6. Two important bankruptcy questions were decided, the first having
to do with Section 77B, 12 2 the second with the revised Frazier-Lemke
Act. 2 3 In both the decisions were unanimous.
Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co.124 involved the statute limiting a land-
lord's claim for indemnity to an amount not to exceed three years' rent.
125
In the particular case the loss sustained by the landlord was about twice the
amount allowable under the law, a difference of over $4o,ooo. Justice
Roberts, in upholding the law, pointed out that Congress was not denied
the power to impair contracts; that, indeed every bankruptcy resulted in
such impairment. While Congress could not destroy the contract altogether,
it could affect the creditor's remedy pursuant to a fair and reasonable plan
for the distribution of the debtor's assets. He recalled that landlords' claims
for future rent had not always been provable, that it was necessary to make
them provable in order to make reorganization of corporate enterprises pos-
sible, and that Congress had discretion in determining the extent to which
they should be provable on account of the inherent difficulties in establishing
the amount of the loss and the at best contingent character of such claims.
He pointed out also that landlords get their property back, whereas mer-
chandise creditors do not. The possibility that different landlords might in
this way receive varying proportions of their theoretical losses was dismissed
as of no consequence.
In the other case, Wright v. Mountain Trust Bank,12 6 the law in ques-
tion 127 was also upheld. Justice Brandeis found that the new law had re-
moved the objections which he himself had voiced against the original
one 128 by expressly preserving the lien of the mortgage until the debt is
paid, permitting the owner, however, to remain in possession under control
of the court, and by expressly preserving the mortgagee's right to a judicial
sale upon the termination of the stay authorized. The contention that this
stay, fixed at three years, was unreasonable, was met with the answer that
the law did not require so long a stay and gave the court discretion to order
a sale sooner. Finding the language of the law lacking in clarity, Justice
Brandeis turned to Congressional records and found that they confirmed his
122. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), II U. S. C. A. §207 et seq. (Supp. 1936).
123. 49 STAT. 942 (1935), II U. S. C. A. §203 et seq. (Supp. 1936).
124. 299 U. S. 445 (I937), 85 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 641, 37 CoL. L. REv. 489. See also Note
(1937) 5o HARv. L. REv. 1290.
125. BANKRUPTCY AcT, § 77B (b) 10, 48 STAT. 914 (934), ii U. S. C. A. §207b (Supp.
1936).
126. 300 U. S. 440 (1937), 37 COL. L. REv. 1005, 32 ILL. L. REV. 239.
127. Only subsection s of § 75 of the Frazier-Lemke Act was involved. 49 STAT. 942-945
(1935), II U. S. C. A. §203 (Supp. 1936).
128. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bk. v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 578 (935).
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construction. The Court held also that it was not a requisite of due process
that the mortgagee have the right to put a receiver in possession. Justice
Brandeis pointed to the similar practice in the reorganization of corporations
which permitted them to remain in possession.129 The law, he emphasized,
dealt with farmers interested in conserving the value of their land.
130
7. Other federal cases covered a variety of subjects,' 31 one of the most
important being an extension of the holding of the Gold Clause case 132 to a
lease calling for a rental payment of a quantity of gold equal to a certain
sum in gold dollars.' 33  In view of the business of the parties it was evident
that money, not a commodity, was to be paid as rent. Justice Cardozo de-
clared that the argument that such leases were so rare that their enforcement
according to their terms would not interfere with the country's monetary
policy created no limitation on the power of Congress. The four con-
servative justices dissented without opinion.
In view of Professor Lowndes' discussion elsewhere in this issue,' 34
it is not necessary to discuss the three federal tax cases which the Court
decided at this term.'3 5
8. State tax questions involving due process were considered in several
cases. Comment will be confined to a brief discussion of a few of them.' 36
129. Citing 48 STAT. 912 (1934), II U. S. C. A. §2o7c (Supp. 1936).
130. Various minor objections were found untenable. One of the points urged was that
rent was not payable until the end of the first year of occupancy. The Court construed the
statute as permissive and refused to consider its validity if mandatory since the lower court
had required semi-annual payments. See 300 U. S. 440, 467.
131. Two interesting unanimous decisions should be mentioned: in Cummings v. Deutsche
Bank und Disconto-Gesellschaft, 300 U. S. 115 (1937), the Court unanimously upheld a Con-
gressional Resolution which postponed the return to Germans of property seized by the
Alien Property Custodian until Germany paid awards on war claims; and in Hill v. United
States ex rel. Weiner, 300 U. S. 105 (1937), the Court approved greater punishment for con-
tempt in a suit to which the United States was a party than might have been inflicted in an
ordinary case.
132. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio, 294 U. S. 240 (1935).
133. Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co., 300 U. S. 324 (1937).
134. Lowndes, The Supreme Court on Taxation, 1936 Term (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L.
REV. I, 11-13.
135. These are United States v. Hudson, 299 U. S. 498 (937), 5o HARv. L. REV. 841;
Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U. S. 308 (1937) (treated briefly supra note 54) ;
Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 57 Sup. Ct. 816 (1937). See Johnson, A. A. A. Refunds: A
Study in Tax Incidence (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 91o. The Court also refused to review sev-
eral decisions which denied injunctions to restrain collection of the "windfall" tax. Sheridan
Flour Mills v. Cassidy, 300 U. S. 664 (1937) ; Steinhagen Rice Milling Co. v. Scofield, 300
U. S. 663 (1937). The law, 49 STAT. 1747 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A. § 345 (Supp. 1936), im-
posed an income tax of 8o%. on all income "unjustly received" because of the AAA decisions,
United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936), 84 U. OF PA. L. Rax. 547; Rickert Rice Mills v.
Fontenot, 297 U. S. 11O (1936).
136. A Texas tax on the production of oil was held to be an excise tax, though labeled
an occupation tax, and therefore validly assessed against a lessor who was not engaged in the
occupation of oil production. Barwise v. Sheppard, 299 U. S. 33 (1936). New York was
allowed to tax a non-resident on profits realized from his seat on the New York Stock Ex-
change, the seat having a business situs in that state even though the owner transacted all of
his business outside New York. New York ex tel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U. S. 366 (1937),
37 COL. L. REv. 661, 5o HARv. L. REV. 704. And the same state was also permitted to tax
its residents on income derived from real estate situated outside the state, an income tax
being proportioned to the taxpayer's ability to pay and based on the protection given him by
the state of his residence. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308 (1937) [thus
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The question of the right of a state to tax property not situated within its
borders was raised in the Louisiana chain store case, Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Gros]ean.1 37  Because the tax was graduated on the basis
of all the stores operated by the company, it was argued that the state was
taxing stores located outside its boundaries. Justice Roberts held otherwise,
because the subject of the tax was the conduct of business within the state,
a business which the state could wholly forbid and which, therefore, it could
permit on conditions. 13 8
In First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota,13 9 the Court unanimously
upheld the taxation of bank stock held by a corporation by the state of
its commercial, as distinguished from its legal, domicil. It found it unneces-
sary to consider whether this ruling affected the right of other states to tax
the same stock, such taxes resting on the fact that the banks were incorpo-
rated and did business there. The vexed question of whether double taxa-
tion is prohibited by the due process clause still remains open.1
40
In two recent cases '4. the Court has treated as identical questions of
due process and of undue burden on interstate commerce, a confusion surely
wholly unnecessary. A tax may be a burden on interstate commerce, as
has been shown, 4 2 provided it is so large that the receipts exceed the proper
expenses for the bearing of which it was imposed; a tax may also, although
not too large in this sense, be imposed in so arbitrary a manner as to run
afoul of the due process clause. It is difficult to see, however, in what
respects arguments addressed to one of these contentions have any applica-
settling the point presented in Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U. S. 52 (1934) ], 85
U. OF PA. L. REV. 645, 37 COL L. REV. 661. On this point see Jacobson, State Jurisdiction to
Tax Incomes (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 796; Stimson, Jurisdiction to Tax Income (1937)
22 CORN. L. Q. 487; Note (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 148. See also TULLER, THE TAXING PowER
(I937), reviewed by Fraenkel (937) 46 YALE L. J. 1275.
The Court was unanimous in Binney v. Long, 299 U. S. 206 (1936), 85 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 428 (I937), 37 COL. L. REv. 874, which permitted the taxation by Massachusetts of re-
mainders which had not vested until after the passage of the applicable law.
137. 57 Sup. Ct. 772 (1937). Further treatment of this case will be found infra at note
'79.
138. Justice Sutherland disagreed. He considered the law an attempt to punish the tax-
payer for acts performed elsewhere than in the taxing state. Justices McReynolds and Butler
agreed with him. (Neither Justice Van Devanter nor Justice Stone sat on this case).
139. 301 U. S. 234 (I937).
140. Prior to the line of cases culminating with First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S.
312 (1932), 8o U. OF PA. L. REV. 6o5, the Court had frequently declared that the Constitution
did not prohibit double taxation. See Kid v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 73o, 732 (903) ; Citizens
Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99, 109 (I921). The subject is discussed at length by TULLER, op.
cit. supra note 136, at 270-305. The income tax cases, Lawrence v. Mississippi, 286 U. S. 276
(1932), and People ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308 (937), have cast doubt upon the
view that these earlier dicta have been completely repudiated.
141. Great Northern Ry. v. Washington, 300 U. S. 154 (1937), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv.
639; Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Alabama, 3O U. S. 148 (937). In the former, justice
Roberts said, at page 400: "If the exaction be so unreasonable and disproportionate to the
service as to impugn the good faith of the law it cannot stand either under the commerce
clause or the Fourteenth Amendment." In the latter case, the Court did not expressly dis-
cuss the due process contention of the appellant but apparently assumed that it had disposed
of it when it had disposed of the commerce question.
142. See supra note 62.
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bility to the other. It is regrettable that the Court should let itself be drawn
by the zeal of counsel into such confusion of thought as this.
9. Various state regulatory laws and orders were, in all but two cases,
unanimously upheld. Chicago was allowed 143 to compel coal brought into
the city to be weighed by a city weighmaster even though it had previously
been weighed by a state official. A Texas law forbidding the use of sweet
natural gas for the manufacture of carbon black was approved 144 as a
proper regulation of natural resources. South Carolina was upheld 141 in
its efforts to compel the manufacturers of fertilizers to give certain infor-
mation concerning the ingredients of their products, even though this might
involve disclosure of secret formulae, there being no proof that the expense
of compliance would be prohibitive. And the contention that the Georgia
legislature, in decreeing the regulation of charges by tobacco warehousemen,
had denied due process because it had conducted no special inquiry, was
overruled; 146 the legislature was presumed to know the facts.
The Court held 147 that the due process clause was not violated when
a public utility was permitted to charge rates higher than those previously
fixed by a contract after the state utilities board had found the higher rates
necessary. Nor was there any deprivation of due process because a board
was given the right to refuse to register cosmetics without holding a hearing,
when the party aggrieved was given the right to appeal from such refusal. 48
In two cases the Court unanimously decided against the state. In
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp.149 orders limiting the produc-
tion of gas from certain wells were set aside because they were made not to
stop waste of natural resources but to compel one set of owners to buy from
another. Justice Brandeis found this to be a "glaring instance" 150 of taking
property from one in order to give it to another, saying: "And this Court
has many times warned that one person's property may not be taken for the
benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose, even
though compensation be paid." 151 The argument that this regulation was
part of a total plan which plaintiff had partially sponsored was answered
by pointing out that plaintiff had not consented to the restrictions it
objected to.
143. Hauge v. Chicago, 299 U. S. 387 (1937).
x44. Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U. S. 258 (1937). See infra note 232 for treat-
ment of this case under the contract clause.
145. National Fertilizer Ass'n v. Bradley, 3O U. S. 178 (1937).
146. Townsend v. Yeomans, 57 Sup. Ct. 842 (1937) (the Court determined also that no
proof of confiscation had been made).
147. Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 300 U. S. 109 (1937).
148. Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183 (1937).
149. 300 U. S. 55 (1937).
I5O. Id. at 79.
igr. Id. at 8o.
T1ATIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
In Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Con .152 the Court
condemned the procedure of the Ohio Utilities Commission. In a rate pro-
ceeding that body had taken proof of the value of plaintiff's property as of
1925. In its report, filed nine years later, it fixed rates for the intervening
years on the basis-of valuations for those years which it had established by
the application of price trend figures. No evidence on this subject had
been presented to the commission. It refused to permit a rehearing to enable
the company to give evidence concerning the value of its property in the
later years. This, said Justice Cardozo, was a denial of all proper aspects
of a hearing. Since there was nothing in the record to show what facts had
been considered by the commission, it was impossible for the company to
know what it had to meet. No question of judicial notice existed, because,
while that might establish that there had been a decline in values, it could
not determine the amount of such decline. Justice Cardozo characterized
the proceedings as "condemnation without trial".
1 5 3
io. Both interesting and far-reaching in its implications is Justice
Stone's re-affirmation 14 of a former dictum 155 to the effect that due process
does not include the right to appeal. And, although the due process clause
was not mentioned in its opinion, the Court no doubt had it in mind when
it determined 156 that no state was required by the Constitution to entertain
a habeas corpus proceeding in order to test a constitutional question after
conviction, the proper way to do this being by appeal from the conviction.
I i. Another case which belongs under this head, although again no
specific reference to due process is made in the opinion, is American Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. United States.157 The company objected to certain accounting
rules set up by the Federal Communications Commission, primarily to the
requirement that all items for plant acquisition be entered at original cost
to the first user and that amounts representing the difference between such
cost and the actual cost to the telephone company be separately stated. The
company expressed the fear that the difference would be arbitrarily charged
off. The Court unanimously rejected this contention, largely because the
government had disclaimed any intention of requiring such writing off.
Justice Cardozo justified the requirement for separate statement of original
cost because so many purchases of plant and equipment had been carried
out between members of the same system so that the resultant price paid
was not, perhaps, representative of the real value. Even when purchases
were from independent companies, the price may often have represented
nuisance value rather than actual value. It was for the Commission to deter-
152. 301 U. S. 292 (,937).
153. Id. at 30o.
154. See District of Col. v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, 627 (1937).
,55. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 687 (894).
156. Woolsey v. Best, 299 U. S. I (1936).
157. 299 U. S. 232 (936).
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mine what portion of the actual price paid should properly remain as
investment.
The company objected also to the requirement that all charges be just
and reasonable. This rule was upheld as necessary to prevent padding of
accounts, especially since punishment for violation could take place only if
the violation was knowing and wilful. Classification of "plant" into that
now in use and that held for future service was found neither vague nor
arbitrary. Finally, the Court held that the expense of revising the accounts
in order to comply with the rules would not be unreasonably great.
A number of other cases involving the due process clause will be con-
sidered in connection with the subject of civil liberties. 158
EQUAL PROTECTION
I. Almost always, when a law is attacked as violative of due process,
it is also attacked as being a denial of equal protection. If it is a federal law,
any attack based on discrimination must be formulated in terms of due
process, since the equal protection clause is a restraint upon the states only.159
The line has not yet been drawn between discriminatory provisions which
pass muster under the due process clause and those which are defective as
denying equal protection. 160 The current cases throw no new light on the
distinction the Court will ultimately draw. In one,' 61 an order was chal-
lenged because it compelled plaintiff and not its competitors to furnish
shipping data. Without discussing what would be prohibited discrimina-
tion, the Court here unanimously concluded there had been no discrimination
at all. In the federal Social Security cases 16 Justice Cardozo said merely
that the exemptions claimed to be discriminatory were permissible even to
a state. And in the State Unemployment Insurance case 163 similar exemp-
tions were considered and found within permissible legislative discretion.
Distinctions such as the taxation only of persons employing eight or more
people could be justified on administrative grounds; it was for the legislature,
not the courts, to draw the precise line. The dissenting judges did not dis-
agree with these conclusions of the majority. Similar reasoning led to the
approval 104 of the classification adopted by Washington in its minimum
158. See infra pp. 62-67.
159. See LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U. S. 377, 392 (1921).
16o. See 2 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (ist ed. [91o) § 475; cf. United States
v. Armstrong, 265 Fed. 683, 691 (D. Ind. 1920) ; United States v. Yount, 267 Fed. 86I, 863
(W. D. Pa. 1920). The Lever Act was held void under the due process clause in United
States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (921). See also Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267
U. S. 442, 450 (1924).
161. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U. S. 139 (937).
162. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 57 Sup. Ct. 883 (1937) ; Helvering v. Davis, 57
Sup. Ct. 904 (1937).
163. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 868 (937).
x64. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (937), 22 CORN. L. Q. 613, 46
YALE, L. J. 1227. See infra pp. 48-40 for full treatment of this case.
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wage legislation and to the differentiation 165 between branded and un-
branded merchandise which underlies the various fair trade laws.
2. A more troublesome question than these was presented by Wiscon-
sin's anti-injunction law, 166 which applied only to labor disputes. Many
years ago by a five-to-four vote in Truax v. Corrigan 167 the Supreme Court
had denied the validity of such a classification in a very similar case. Speak-
ing by Justice Brandeis, the majority of the present Court 168 now distin-
guished the earlier decision on the ground that the acts involved in the
Wisconsin case were lawful. For this reason, said Justice Brandeis, the
issue of equal protection did not arise: "one has no constitutional right to
a remedy against the lawful conduct of another." 169 The minority relied
upon the Truax case without any discussion. It is unfortunate that the
equal protection question was left in so very ambiguous a form. Perhaps
it was impossible to secure the concurrence of the fifth justice to a complete
overruling of this portion of the Truat case. However, the equal protection
issue actually arises only in a case where the Court finds the acts complained
of by the employer to be unlawful and concludes that the legislature did not
intend to declare them lawful. In other words, the effect of the statute
would be to leave intact all legal remedies for wrongs committed, but, in
labor cases only, to abolish or restrict injunctive remedies. No case has yet
arisen in which the Supreme Court has accepted this distinction.
3. Many of the state cases have been discussed in other connections.
In the Chicago Coal case 170 the Court could find no discrimination between
local and outside dealers. In Henderson Co. v. Thompson 1.1 Justice Bran-
deis said that the difference between sour gas and sweet gas justified the
difference in treatment which the law afforded. In the California Beer
Import case 172 Justice Brandeis declared that what was permitted by the
Twenty-first Amendment could not be forbidden by the Fourteenth. He
also found the distinction between domestic and imported beers justified by
the inability of the state to levy a manufacturer's tax upon the latter. All
these decisions were unanimous.
In the Great Northern case 173 the opinion of the majority contains a
suggestion that the imposition of fees upon utilities for the cost of regula-
165. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagrams Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936). And see
supra note 120.
166. Cited supra note 113.
167. 257 U. S. 312 (1921).
168. Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 57 Sup. Ct. 857 (937). For discussion of this case
under due process, see supra pp. 52-53.
169. 57 Sup. Ct. at 864.
17o. Hauge v. Chicago, 299 U. S. 387 (1937).
171. 300 U. S. 285 (1937).
172. State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 (1936), 37 Cor. L.
Ray. 307, 5o HARv. L. REV. 353, 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 322 (1937).
173. 300 U. S. 154 (,937). For full discussion of this case in connection with states'
rights, see supra pp. 45-46.
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tion in some way involves the equal protection clause, a suggestion carried
forward by Justice Brandeis in the Maine Cosmetic case. 174  It is difficult
to understand these references. There seems to be here the same confusion
between interstate commerce questions and equal protection which seems to
have been made between interstate commerce and due process.175 It is
hardly conceivable that the Court would declare unconstitutional a statute
which imposed fees on certain intrastate industries merely because of the
classification adopted by the legislature.
1 7 6
4. Two chain store cases came before the Court. In one 177 it held
the law bad as a tax on gross sales, following its earlier ruling in the Stewart
case.. 78  In the other, 179 by a four-to-three decision, the Court upheld a
Louisiana law 180 which graduated the tax by the number of stores operated
by the chain, regardless of where such stores might be located. The minor-
ity reiterated the views expressed in the original Chain Store case, 81 finding
this one more aggravated because the stores used in determining the tax were
not confined to those in the taxing state. They found discrimination in the
Louisiana law between members of what they described as the same class,
namely owners of a like number of stores operating in the state. The major-
ity, however, disputed the contention that there was any such class; the
class considered by the legislature, they maintained, was a class of stores
and it made no difference where they were located. Justice Roberts
was unable to see how, if competitive advantages increase with an increase
in the number of stores, this condition should be affected by state lines. The
state court had found that such advantages existed, primarily in purchasing
power, and the evidence sustained the findings. The Liggett case 182 was
distinguished, since there the graduation was based not on total number of
stores but on the number located in any one county.
5. Another case in which the Court divided sharply was Hartford
Steam Boiler Inspection &, Ins. Co. v. Harrison.83 The majority held void
a Georgia statute 184 which forbade the salaried employees of insurance
companies to act as agents of fire or casualty companies but
174. Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183 (937) (where no equity was found to
exist).
175. See supra p. 56.
176. Another case involving the equal protection clause was Binney v. Long, 299 U. S.
28o (1936), where the Court held that a Massachusetts law which taxed property passing
under powers of appointment denied equal protection when applied to two separate trusts
created prior to the passage of the law.
177. Valentine v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 299 U. S. 32 (1936) (justices
Brandeis and Cardozo dissenting without opinion).
178. Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550 (1935).
179. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grossjean, 57 Sup. Ct. 772 (1937). See also
mipra note 137.
i8o. LA. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1936) §§ 8664, 8666.
i8r. State Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (193).
182. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933).
183. 301 U. S. 459 (1937).
184. Ga. Laws 1935, no. 396, p. 139.
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permitted salaried employees of mutual companies to do so. Justice
McReynolds, for the majority, could see no basis which related to
the subject of the law in the distinction between insurance companies organ-
ized for profit and mutual companies. He said that none of the state courts
had been able to find such a difference, nor had counsel. Nevertheless,
Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts and Cardozo dissented. Their spokesman,
Justice Roberts, took the position that since it was conceivable that local
conditions justified the difference in treatment of the employees of the two
kinds of companies, the attack on the law must fall. He adverted also to
the small amount of business done by the mutual companies as justification
for the distinction. Another basis for the difference, he said, was the fact
that a salaried agent of a mutual company works for the policy holders
while a like agent of a stock company works for the stockholders. It
remains somewhat difficult to understand what all this has to do with the
objects of the statute; the views of the minority go to extreme lengths to
uphold an irrational classification.
6. An unusual case was that of Phelps v. Board of Education.8 5 A
New Jersey school teacher complained of a salary reduction plan on the
ground that different rates of reduction were applied to different salary
levels. Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, was unable to see
anything improper in a division of employees into classes based on their
compensation.
CIVIL LIBERTIES
In this field the decisions of the Court have assumed special importance
since the public lays such great stress upon the role which the Court plays
as protector of civil liberties. During the arguments over the President's
Court proposal there came about a re-appraisal of this role,'8 6 leading to
the conclusion that the Court has not always been so great a defender of
civil liberties as the opponents of the President's plan like to make it appear.
In recent years, especially in cases coming from the states, the one way in
which the Court has appreciably extended its influence in the field has been
by showing an increased conception of the requirements of due process.ls 7
185. 300 U. S. 319 (1937). See infra note 231 for treatment of this case under the con-
tract clause.
186. See Boudin, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights (1937) I ScI. AND Soc. 273;
Donovan, An Independent Supreme Court and the Protection of Minority Rights (1937) 23
A. B. A. J. 254; Edgerton, The Incidence of JTudicial Control over Congress (937) 22
CORN. L. Q. 299, 301-311, 320-325; Fraenkel, Judicial Review and Civil Liberties (1937) 6
BROOKLYN L. REV. 409. See also FRAENKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
(Am. Civil Lib. Union, 1937).
187. After the Court had expanded the conception of the due process clause beyond its
original procedural meaning in cases involving property rights, it became increasingly difficult
not to do so in civil liberties cases. The reluctance with which it reached its present position
is manifest in cases involving free speech. In Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454 (1907),
and Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273 (1915), the Court cast doubt upon the applicability
of the Fourteenth Amendment; in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530 (1922),
is found the statement that the Constitution imposed no restrictions on the States in his re-
spect.
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Two of the decisions of the 1936 term carry this important development
further.
i. In DeJonge v. Oregon 8 s the Court unanimously set aside a convic-
tion under a criminal syndicalism law. The defendant had been charged with
participation in a meeting sponsored by the Communist party. It was not
claimed that he had himself said or done anything unlawful; nor was it
charged that the meeting had violated the law. To punish a person because
of the auspices under which he speaks, said the Chief Justice, constitutes
such an interference with freedom of speech and of assemblage as to amount
to a denial of due process. He said:
" . . the legislative intervention can find constitutional justifica-
tion only by dealing with the abuse. The rights themselves must not
be curtailed. . . . It follows from these considerations that, consistently
with the Federal Constitution, peaceable assembly for lawful discussion
cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable politi-
cal action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of
such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The ques-
tion, if the rights of free speech and peacable assembly are to be pre-
served, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but
as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether
their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which
the Constitution protects, ..... ,189
Thus, for the first time, freedom of assemblage has been added to those
rights looked on as so fundamental 190 that they are protected against state
action by the Fourteenth Amendment. The question whether a state may
punish mere membership in an organization 191 which advocates unlawful
doctrine was left undecided as not involved. But the Chief Justice com-
mented on the fact that De Jonge had not been indicted for joining the
Communist party, of which he was a member.
A different problem in relation to the Communist party came up in the
Herndon case.192  Under an ancient law of Georgia,19 3 drawn originally
in order to quell uprisings of slaves, Herndon, a Negro organizer for the
Communist party, was found guilty of inciting to insurrection. He had
induced various persons to become members of the party, and had in his
188. 299 U. S. 353 (1937), 85 U. oF PA. L. REv. 532, 50 HA~v. L. REv. 689, 46 YALE L.
J. 862.
i89. 299 U. S. at 364.
I9o. See Fraenkel, What Can be Done about the Constitution and the Supreme Court?
(3937) 37 COL. L. REV. :2I2, 220-221, n. 6o, 61.
19r.No case has ever squarely presented the problem to the Supreme Court.
192. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (937), 5o HARv. L. REv. 1313, 46 YALE L. J.
862. This was an appeal from habeas corpus proceedings permitted by Georgia practice after
the Supreme Court had dismissed an appeal from the judgment of conviction on the ground
that no federal question had been properly presented. Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441
(935). That the second appeal to the Supreme Court would have been impossible had the
state courts disputed the practice is evident from Woolsey v. Best, 299 U. S. 1 (1936).
193. GA. CODE (1933) § 26-90o2 (Ga. Acts 1871, p. i9).
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possession when arrested single copies of booklets which the state claimed
proved that the Communist party sought to overthrow the state by force.
The prosecution depended principally on a booklet which advocated the estab-
lishing of a black belt where Negroes were to have the right of self-determi-
nation. Such advocacy, said the state court,194 necessarily involved the use
of force, since the communists must have known they could not hope to
accomplish an aim such as this in any other way. The majority of the
Supreme Court voided the conviction on two grounds. They held that
Herndon's freedom of speech had been infringed upon in the absence of
proof either that he had advocated any of the doctrines in the literature or
that the persons he had solicited as members even knew about them. Further,
they decided that, as construed by the state courts, the statute was too vague
and indefinite to allow of conviction. The standard laid down by the state
court permitted the jury to convict provided force might result at any time
within which defendant might reasonably expect his influence to bring it
about. That, said Justice Roberts, sanctioned the punishment of words hav-
ing a "dangerous tendency". It created "a dragnet which may enmesh
anyone who agitates for a change of government". 195
This opinion is noteworthy in that it quotes with approval the "clear
and present danger" rule of the Espionage case,' 96 until then generally
ignored in state criminal syndicalism cases.' 97 It also makes it clear that the
power of the state to punish speech is exceptional:
"The power of a state to abridge freedom of speech and of assem-
bly is the exception rather than the rule and the penalizing even of
utterances of a defined character must find its justification in a reason-
able apprehension of danger to organized government. The judgment of
the legislature is not unfettered. The limitation upon individual liberty
must have appropriate relation to the safety of the state. Legislation
which goes beyond this need violates the principle of the Constitu-
tion." 198
Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler dissented
from the decision. They were of the opinion that the standard laid down by
the state court was sufficiently definite because it meant in effect that a defend-
ant could not be convicted unless forcible resistance should "proximately
result from his act of inducement". 19 9 Justice Van Devanter analyzed the
evidence and concluded that it could be inferred that Herndon had distributed
194. See Herndon v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 867, 174 S. E. 597, 615 (1934).
195. 301 U. S. at 263.
196. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (199). The rule was not always sensibly
applied: see Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919) ; Pierce v. United States, 252 U.
S. 239 (1920).
197. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S.
357 (1927).
198. 301 U. S. at 258.
199. Id. at 277.
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the literature complained of by the state and that the distribution of inflam-
matory matter by a Negro to other Negroes was equivalent to advice to resort
to force, "for all know that such measures could not be effected otherwise". 200
2. Another free speech case (really a free press case) left the justices
with their positions reversed. The four who had voted against Herndon
again dissented, this time, however, because they were of the opinion that the
constitutional privilege had been impaired. The question arose in the case
of Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Bd.20 1 over the discharg
of Watson, an editorial writer, due to his activities on behalf of the News-
paper Guild. The Press contended that to compel it to reinstate Watson
would violate the freedom of the press. Again Justice Roberts wrote for the
majority; this time it was Justice Sutherland who wrote the dissenting
opinion.
The argument of the minority was based upon the importance of an
unbiased press and the fear that reporters who belong to unions might not
be impartial in their rendering of the struggles between capital and labor,
or, at least, that each employer should be free to determine for himself
whether employees were so or not. They insisted that their decision did not
impair the right of employees to bargain collectively and eloquently called on
the people to resist at the beginning any encroachment upon their fundamental
liberties. For, said Justice Sutherland, " . . . the saddest epitaph which can
be carved in memory of a vanished liberty is that it was lost because its pos-
sessors failed to stretch forth a saving hand while yet there was time." 202
These arguments enlisted no support from the majority. Justice Roberts
stressed the fact that bias had not been charged against Watson and that if
it should appear that he failed to perform his duties as an impartial editorial
writer he could be dismissed for that reason.
3. Three cases arose involving jury questions. In two of these the Court
was again divided, with judges reputed as conservative contending that the
Constitution had been violated.
In United States v. Wood '03 the issue was whether, in a criminal case
in the District of Columbia, Congress could authorize government employes
to sit as jurors. The argument to the contrary rested on the guarantee of a
trial by an "impartial" jury,20 4 and was to the effect that a government em-
ploye in a case in which the government was a party could not be impartial.
Some intimations to that effect had been given by the Supreme Court many
years ago in the Crawford case. 205 The majority of the present Court, by
200. Id. at 276.
201. 301 U. S. 103 (,937). For discussion of the interestate commerce feature of this
case, see supra note 31.
202. Id. at 41.
203. 299 U. S. 123 (1936), 5o HARv. L. REv. 692 (937).
204. U. S. CONST. Amend. VI.
205. Crawford v. United States, 212 U. S. x83 (i9o9).
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the Chief Justice, pointed out that in the Crawford case the Court had dealt
with a question of statutory construction, not with the issue of Congressional
power. He insisted that there was no basis for the contention that bias
must be presumed as a matter of law, recognizing that in each case the rela-
tionship of the employe with the facts involved could be explored to make
sure that no bias existed in fact. He reviewed the English precedents to
ascertain whether, at the time the Constitution was adopted, any rule existed
from which it might be argued that it was intended to exclude government
employes from jury service, and was unable to deduce a rule sufficiently
definite. He argued that, in any event, Congress could have changed such a
rule, since the qualifications of jurors were not included in what the Court
had previously declared to be essential to trial by jury: that there be twelve
men, supervised by a judge, who reach a unanimous decision. 206 Justices
McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler dissented briefly, relying entirely on the
Crawford case.
In District of Columbia v. Clawans207 the question related to the right
to a jury trial. Congress had created police courts for the District of Columbia
for the trial of petty offenses without a jury. Of its constitutional right to
do this there could be no question.208  Miss Clawans was charged with selling
railroad tickets without a license, the punishment for this offense being a fine
of not more than $300 or imprisonment for not more than ninety days.
There was no question but that the nature of the crime was such that a jury
trial could be dispensed with. But it was argued on behalf of the defend-
ant that the severity of the possible punishment changed this. The majority
rejected the argument. Ninety days, said Justice Stone,200 had not been an
unusual punishment for petty offenses in the colonies.
Justices McReynolds and Butler disagreed. Since the majority re-
versed the conviction for errors committed at the trial, the dissent they
expressed through Justice McReynolds was only partial. Their argument
rested chiefly on the fact that the Constitution guaranteed trial by jury in
civil cases involving more than $2o.oo.210
In the third case 211 the question related to the right of Congress in
the National Labor Relations Act to permit the Board to award money
damages for lost wages after a hearing without a jury. The Chief
Justice noted that the Seventh Amendment referred only to suits at com-
mon law. The proceedings authorized by the Wagner Act were not of that
2o6. Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 (1930).
207. 300 U. S. 617 (1937).
208. See Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65, 98 (1904).
209. 300 U. S. at 625.
21o. U. S. CONST. Amend. VII.
21i. See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3O U. S. i
(1937). For further discussion of this case, see supra notes 23, IoI.
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character. The justices who dissented from the application of the law
to the industry did not discuss this point.
4. In Lindsey v. Washington 212 the Court unanimously declared void a
law changing the manner in which sentence must be imposed. At the time of
the commission of the crime for which the defendant was convicted the law
provided for an indeterminate form of sentence. Under the new law 2
1
3
the judge was required to sentence him to the maximum term originally
provided for this offense. The parole board was given power to release
defendant earlier. Justice Stone held there was considerable difference
between giving discretion to the judge at the time of sentence and permitting
a board later to let a prisoner out on parole: in the latter event he remained
subject to surveillance during the entire period. Since the new law thus
worked to the substantial disadvantage of the defendant, it violated the
constitutional provision against ex post facto laws, whether or not it might
be said to inflict a greater punishment.
5. In Valentine v. United States 214, executive power to extradite citi-
zens was unanimously restricted. The brothers Neidecker, American citi-
zens, charged in France with various extraditable offenses, fled to New
York. President Roosevelt ordered their return to France. The Supreme
Court sustained writs of habeas corpus which challenged the President's
authority. The Chief Justice ruled that the President had no constitutional
power to order extradition and that such power could arise only from Act
of Congress or treaty. Since existing treaties did not specifically include
American citizens, it could not be presumed that it was intended to include
them. The Chief Justice said of the President's power: "the Constitution
creates no executive prerogative to dispose of the liberty of the individual.
Proceedings against him must be authorized by law." 215
DELEGATION OF POWERS
i. The Court made clear that this doctrine had no relation to state
legislation, at least insofar as the Federal Constitution was concerned. In
the Virginia Milk case,216 since the highest court of the state had held 2".
there was no improper delegation under the state constitution, there was
nothing for a federal court to consider. Yet where the delegation is to
private instead of public agencies, the question may well be a different one.
212. 57 Sup. Ct. 797 (1937).
213. Wash. Laws 1935, c. 114, § 2.
214. 299 U. S. 5 (1936) ; see Note (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 525.
215. 299 U. S. at 9.
216. Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnev, 300 U. S. 6o8 (1937) (for further treatment see
supra note 71). To the same effect is Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183 (1937).
217. Reynolds v. Milk Commission of Va., 163 Va. 957, 179 S. E. 507 (1935).
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For in such a case considerations of due process may supervene.218  The
Court, nevertheless, found no instance of this in the Fair Trade cases.
219
2. Two federal laws presented the problem in its broader aspects. By
the Neutrality Resolution of 1934 220 Congress had authorized the President
to forbid the sale of arms to any of the countries then at war in the Chaco.
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.221 the Court upheld the
discretion vested in the President. Justice Sutherland said that in the realm
of foreign affairs the power of the President under the Constitution was so
broad that it was permissible to grant him discretionary powers which might
be an unlawful delegation if concerned with internal affairs. He reviewed
a long and unbroken practice of Congress in that regard, which the Court
would "not feel at liberty at this late day to disturb".222 Justice McReynolds
dissented, without saying more than that the lower court had rightly held
the delegation excessive.
In the Cocoanut Oil Processing Tax case 23 it was argued that Con-
gress had unlawfully delegated the manner of expending certain of the
proceeds by directing that they be paid into the Philippine treasury without
also prescribing how the money was to be spent. The Court unanimously
disposed of this argument on the grounds that Congress had frequently
authorized public agencies to spend money as they thought best and was
here dealing with a dependency in connection with which it had full sovereign
powers.
TAXATION OF SOVEREIGN INSTRUMENTALITIES
It is a familiar doctrine that the states may not tax federal agencies
nor the Federal Government tax state instrumentalities. Yet it has not always
been easy for the courts to determine instances for the application of the gen-
eral rule.2 2 4 Some difficulty was found in fixing the status of the general
counsel to the Panama Railroad, a wholly owned instrumentality of the
United States. New York sought to levy an income tax upon his salary on
the ground that the railroad was a commercial enterprise. The Supreme
Court unanimously declared 225 this could not be done. The canal, said Jus-
218. See Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137 (1912) ; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U. S. 238, 311 (1936).
219. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936) ; Pep
Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U. S. 198 (1936).
220. 48 STAT. 8I (1934).
221. 299 U. S. 304 (936), 5o HARV. L. Rzv. 691 (1937).
222. Id. at 329.
223. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U. S. 308 (1937).
224. See Powell, National Taxation of State Instrumentalities (1936) 20 ILL. STUDIES
IN Soc. SCr. No 4; Note (1936) 22 CORN. L. Q. 135.
225. New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401 (1937), 22 CORN. L. Q. 460, 5o
HAv. L. Riv. 98o.
Two other unanimous decisions involved Indian oil lands. A Montana tax on the pro-
duction of oil was sustained because of express Congressional consent. British-American
Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization of Mont., 299 U. S. 159 (1936). And an Okla-
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tice Sutherland, was clearly immune from taxation. The railroad, although
used in part to carry private freight and passengers, was primarily used for
governmental purposes. Its officers, therefore, were immune from taxation
by the states.
A federal case 226 presented an analogous situation to the one just dis-
cussed. The United States attempted to levy an income tax on the salary
of New York City's Chief Water Supply Engineer. Again it was urged
that the activity was commercial, not governmental, and again the Court
ruled otherwise, this time without unanimity. The majority, by Justice
Sutherland, reviewed the history of the supplying of water and concluded
that this was an essential governmental function of a city like New York.
They confined the decision to the particular case and took care to formulate
no rule generally applicable to municipal activities. The fact that the city
charged a fee, or even made a profit, was held immaterial. Justices Stone
and Cardozo concurred in the result on the sole ground that the treasury
regulations had recognized the engineer's exempt character, it therefore
being unnecessary to review the fundamental question of immunities. Jus-
tices Brandeis and Roberts dissented in an opinion written by the latter,
taking the position that not every tax imposed upon a sovereign instru-
mentality was void. They sought to establish the rule that the tax was
bad only if it discriminated against the instrumentality or was clearly direct.
They could see no reason why a person performing services similar to those
performed for private agencies should escape taxation on his compensation
merely because in a certain instance he was employed by a public agency.
It is curious that these views were not similarly expressed in the Panama
Railroad case, for they apply to it in the same measure as to the case just
mentioned.
The fact seems to be that in these two cases the Court has laid down
a rule unduly favorable to the Federal Government: all federal agencies
constitutionally created are exempt from state taxation; but state agencies
are exempt from federal taxation only if they are necessary to the carrying
on of governmental functions. It is high time that this whole subject be
given fresh consideration.
22 7
homa tax on property used by a corporation in connection with its exploitation of a lease on
Indian lands was upheld on the ground that the influence of the tax upon the operations was
at best remote. Taber v. Indian Terr. Illuminating Co., 3oo U. S. 1 (937). Both decisions
followed settled authority.
226. Brush v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 300 U. S. 352 (1937), 37 CoL. L. Rzv. o1ig,
50 HAxv. L. Ray. 980.
In Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 383 (1937), 5o HAv. L.
REv. 69o, the United States sought to recover an excise tax on the manufacture of tobacco
which was sold to a state institution for free distribution to patients. The court unaminously
permitted recovery on the ground that the tax, although not payable until the removal or sale
of the tobacco, was not measured by the sales price and hence was not a sales tax; the effect
on the institution was, therefore, indirect.
227. The Attorney General asked the Supreme Court to reconsider certain phases of the
doctrine of sovereign instrumentalities, particularly to overrule Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mis-
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RESTRICTIONS ON THE STATES
i. Among the remaining cases which deal with state laws or proceed-
ings, none presented problems of particular importance. In answer to an
attack 228 upon Virginia's Milk Control law as a denial of a republican form
of government, Justice Cardozo (after disposing of the contention in a
brief sentence) recalled that the enforcement of that particular constitu-
tional guarantee was for Congress, not for the courts. In the Maine Cos-
metics case,229 Justice Brandeis avoided the necessity for passing upon a
search and seizure question raised under the state constitution by pointing
out that none of plaintiff's property was threatened with seizure.
2. The contract clause was invoked in a number of other cases already
considered. In two of these 230 the discussion of the due process contention
disposed also of the argument based on impairment of contracts. In the
New Jersey Teacher's case 231 the Court held that legislation which ensured
against dismissal without cause did not create a contract. And in the
Carbon Black case 232 it was decided that both under the federal and state
constitutions the contract clause did not prevent the passage of measures
under the police power. Similar reasoning led to rejection 233 of the con-
tention that a Texas tax on oil production impaired the terms of leases, re-
gardless of which of the parties might, under such lease, have to assume
the tax.
In Peoples Banking Co. v. Sterling 234 stockholders of failed banks un-
successfully objected to certain changes affecting their liability for debts of
the bank. Justice Cardozo ruled that there had been no impairment of
contracts since the legislature had reserved the right to amend the charter
of the banks and the changes were in the remedy only. He left open the
question of whether the result would have been different had the stock-
holders been held answerable for debts for which they would not have been
liable under the old law. The recent case of Coombes v. Getz 235 was dis-
tinguished in that it involved rights of creditors, not of stockholders.
In like fashion, on the ground that the remedy only was affected, the
Court rejected 236 the contention of a mortgage holder that its rights had
sissippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 (1928) ; Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283
U. S. 570 (193) ; and Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393 (1936). The question arises in
three cases which the Supreme Court ordered reargued at the coming term: James v. Dravo,
Silas Mason Company v. Henneford, and Ryan v. Washington. See 300 U. S. 679 (1937).
See also Lewinson, Tax Exempt Salaries and Securities (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 685.
228. Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 6o8 (1937), discussed supra note 71.
229. Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183 (937), discussed supra note 68.
230. Binney v. Long, 299 U. S. 280 (936) ; Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas City Power
& Light Co., 300 U. S. 109 (1937).
231. Phelps v. Board of Education, 300 U. S. 319 (937).
232. Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 3oo U. S. 258 (937).
233. Barwise v. Sheppard, 299 U. S. 33 (1936).
234. 300 U. S. 175 (937).
235. 285 U. S. 434 (932).
236. Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U. S. 124
01937).
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been impaired. Justice Roberts held that the change in remedy was not so
substantial as to deprive the holder of the mortgage of any essential right.
The new law provided 237 that if the mortgagee bought in the property at
a trustee's sale and sued for a deficiency, a jury might credit the mortgagor
with the true value of the property at the time of the sale. In foreclosure
proceedings as distinguished from a trustee's sale the court had the power
to accomplish the same result irrespective of the new law. Accordingly,
the Court could find no impairment of the contract, since the mortgagee
was entitled to be paid only once. This was accomplished by giving him
the property and a deficiency judgment which took the value of the property
into consideration.
3. The full faith and credit clause received an unusual application in
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates.23- Suit was brought in a
Georgia state court on a life insurance policy made in New York. When
the insurance company contended that the insured had failed to disclose cer-
tain facts about his medical history, plaintiff was permitted to prove that
insured had disclosed the true facts to the agent who had obtained the
policy. The court instructed the jury that if it believed this testimony it
might find that the company had waived strict compliance with the policy.
The law of New York, however, forbade proof of this kind.239  The Su-
preme Court reversed the judgment so rendered in plaintiff's favor, because
it disregarded the law of New York. Justice Brandeis held that the defense
relied upon by the company was given to it by a statute of New York to
which the Georgia court was bound to give effect, and that the law must
be applied as it had been construed by the highest court of New York.
4. In Carlin Construction Co. v. Heaney 240 the Court ruled that under
the New York Workmen's Compensation Act 241 suit could be maintained
in the courts of that state to recover for injuries sustained in the explosion
of a steamer in the East River by an employee who had been engaged in
work on shore. The accident had happened while the employee was being
transported to work by his employer. Although ordinarily the rules of
maritime law would apply to an accident on the river, Justice McReynolds
differentiated this case because the contract of insurance under which the
recovery was sought had no relation to maritime business. He emphasized
the fact that no claim was being *asserted against either the ship or her
owner.
242
237. N. C. CODE (Michie, 1935) § 2593d.
238. 299 U. S. 178 (1936), 37 COL. L. REv. 485 (937), 5o HARv. L. REV. 520.
239. N. Y. CONs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 30, § 58.
240. 299 U. S. 41 (1936).
241. N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill, i93o) c. 66, § io.
242. In addition to the above, four decisions not readily classifiable deserve notice. In
the most important, United States v. Norris, 300 U. S. 564 (937), the conviction for per-
jury before a Congressional committee of George W. Norris, the grocer rival of the Senator
of the same name, was upheld, the Court ruling that the committee could investigate matters
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PRACTICE QUESTIONS
Most of these cases followed established precedent; in all the votes were
unanimous.
I. The Court refused to consider 243 the constitutionality of a part of
Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, even though the lower court had done
so, since the plan involved in the particular case was properly disapproved.
And in other cases 244 the Court refused to consider questions which were
merely hypothetical.
2. In Chisholm v. Gilmer 245 the Court laid to rest a question concern-
ing which there had been some difference of opinion. It was primarily one
of statutory construction, namely whether it was possible to commence a
common law proceeding by notice of motion instead of by process issued
from a court. In passing on this question Justice Cardozo pointed out that
there was no constitutional bar to any method of instituting suit so long as
it gave reasonable notice.
In Mountain States Power Co. v. Public Service Comm.,246 the John-
son Act 247 notwithstanding, the Court approved the institution of suit in a
federal court to enjoin the enforcement of a Montana rate reduction order.
Justice McReynolds rejected the contention that a state statute which for-
bade the granting of any injunction prior to final determination could be
disregarded as unconstitutional, since the Montana courts had not so de-
clared. Until they had done so, it was impossible to say that there existed
such "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" 248 as the Johnson Act required.
3. In three cases the Court refused to pass on constitutional issues be-
cause it believed the cases should be remanded to the lower courts. In one
of these 249 this was done so that the facts might be more fully developed;
occurring in a primary election through the power of Congress over the qualifications of its
members. In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 3oo U. S. 227 (1937), the scope of the Fed-
eral Declaratory Judgment Act was broadened by a unanimous decision. In Isbrandtsen-
Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U. S. 139 (937), and Swayne & Hoyt v. United States, 300
U. S. 297 (937), the Court upheld the power of Congress to ratify the transfer by the Presi-
dent of powers from the Shipping Board to the Secretary of Commerce and even to make
such ratification retroactive.
243. Tennessee Pub. Co. v. American Nat'l Bk., 299 U. S. I8 (936).
244. Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 6o8; cf. United States v. Belmont, 299
U. S. 537 (i937) ; Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 57 Sup. Ct. 816 (937).
245. 299 U. S. 99 (1936). The case rested on practice of Virginia but it would probably
apply to the New York form of summons, as the Court expressly disapproved lower court
decisions which had held to the contrary: Peaslee v. Haberstro, i5 Blatchf. 472 (C. C. N. D.
N. Y. 1879) ; Dwight v. Merritt, 4 Fed. 614 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. i88o) ; United States to use
of Miller v. Mitchell,.223 Fed. 805 (E. D. N. Y. 1915).
246. 299 U. S. 167 (1936).
247. I8 STAT. 470 (1875), as amended in 48 STAT. 775 (i934), 28 U. S. C. A. §4I (I)
et seq. (Supp. 1936)', Legis. (I937) 5o HARv. L. RaV. 813.
248. 48 STAT. 775 (1934), 28 U. S. C. A. §4i (i) (Supp. 1936).
249. Villa v. Van Schaik, 299 U. S. 152 (1936). But see American Propeller & Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 300 U. S. 475 (937), where remand was refused because of the length
of time already consumed in litigation and the unlikelihood that additional evidence would be
discovered (no constitutional issue was involved in that case).
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in another 250 so that the record might be amplified to show just how the
constitutional issue was raised and disposed of in order to make sure its
disposition was essential. The third, Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood
County 2 51 was remanded because events subsequent to the trial had created
a confused record. This case requires some brief comment on account of
both the importance of the constitutional issue involved and the peculiar
circumstances which led to the remand. The power company challenged
the validity of the law, which permitted federal loans to local governments
for the construction of power plants, 252 and sued to enjoin the erection of
the plant by the county. After judgment had been granted in its favor de-
daring the law unconstitutional, the original contract between the county
and the government was cancelled and a new one substituted which eliminated
conditions held by the trial court to be beyond the authority of the county
to make. The Circuit Court of Appeals then remanded the case with in-
structions that the trial court reconsider its decision in the light of the new
contract. At the new hearing additional evidence was taken, but the judge
refused to allow amendment of the pleadings, and limited the new evidence
to matters relating to the new contract. He then decided that none of the
new material caused him to change his original decision. On the second
appeal the complaint was dismissed on the merits.253  The Supreme Court
criticized both lower courts. The appellate court should have reversed the
original judgment instead of remanding the case with ambiguous direc-
tions, it maintained; the trial court failed properly to understand the order
and re-try the case. Then, on the second appeal, the appellate court had
failed to realize that the trial court had not taken the proper steps. So the
Supreme Court ordered that the judgment be set aside, the pleadings
amended and the case tried over again. What additional facts might be
added to the record by this observance of the judicial proprieties was not
intimated. Consequently at this term the Court did not pass on the pressing
question of the validity of these government loans. As a result the con-
struction of power plants has been halted all over the country, with probable
loss to consumers and increased costs of construction due to rising prices.
On the last day of the term the Court consented to hear argument in other
cases involving the same issues.
2 54
25o. Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U. S. 14 (1937). The New York Court of Appeals then
reheard the case and adhered to its original decision that the challenged law was constitu-
tional: 275 N. Y. 382 (1937), 9 N. E. (2d) 970 (1937).
251. 299 U. S. 259 (1936). See Notes 5o HAv. L. REV. 802, 956 (1937). Upon a new
trial, the validity of the law was upheld. See ig F. Supp. 932 (W. D. S. C. 1937), aff'd, 91
F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
252. NATIONAL INDUSTRiAL RacovERY AcT, 48 STAT. 200-202, 204 (933), 40 U. S. C.
A. §§ 4o1-4o3, 406 (Supp. 1936).
253. 81 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
254. On June I, 1937, certiorari was granted to review Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 91
F. (2d) 303 (App. D. C. 1937).
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4. The Court gave qualified approval to an interesting method of
simplifying the work of the government in meeting constitutional problems.
Many suits having been instituted to test the recent utility legislation, the
Government moved to stay one of them until the determination of a test
case. The Supreme Court upheld 255 the government's contention that such
a move was permissible, but remanded the case to the lower court because
the stay it had granted was too drastic.
CONCLUSION
Despite the new trend in the Court, the demand continues for farther-
reaching and more permanent reform. The President has announced that
he still hopes to achieve some form of legislative control. Others insist it is
by constitutional amendment only that substantial progress may be effected.
Liberals seem agreed that some restriction on the power of the Court is not
only essential but inevitable.
256
And the case against the Court is a strong one. Too often have we
seen it the champion and apologist of the powerful. There is no need to
list the valuable measures the Court has condemned as lacking in due
process.257  Nor does it matter essentially that in the matter of minimum
wages a retreat has now been sounded from the more extreme position.
The case against the Court rests primarily on this: that it should ever have
permitted itself to sit in judgment on the wisdom of legislatures. For the
determination of what constitutes due process, when general laws rather
than procedure are involved, is not actually a judicial affair at all. It is a
political or an economic one. And for the solution of problems such as
these a court is not the proper agency.
One group of enemies of the Court believe that the only solution lies in
abolishing altogether the power of judicial review. 258  They argue that no
constitutional amendment re-defining due process would accomplish the end
desired, since the Court would still have the last word in interpreting the
255. Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248 (1936). See Notes (1937) 50 HARV.
L. Rzv. 655, 46 YALE L. J. 897.
256. For recent discussions of the Supreme Court issue see Clark, The Supreme Court
Issue (1937) 26 YALE Rxv. 669; Fite and Rubinstein, Curbing the Supreme Court-State
Experiences and Federal Proposals (1937) 35 MICH. L. REV. 762; Lerner, Constitution and
Court as Symbols (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 129o; Note, The Supreme Court-Another Word
(1937) 32 ILL. L. REV. 2o6.
257. See Edgerton, supra note 186, for federal cases. A discussion of the state cases
will be found in 2 BournN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932) 405-412. See also the follow-
ing articles by Powell: Constitutional Law in r919-192o (1920) 19 MICH. L. REV. 117, 136;
The Supreme Court's Construction of the Federal Constitution in i92o-192i (1922) 20 MICH.
L. REV. 261; The Supreme Court's Adjudication of Constitutional Issues in 1921-1922 (1933)
21 MICH. L. REV. 290, 307; The Supreme Court and State Police Power I922-193o (1931)
17 VA. L. REV. 529, 653, 765, 18 id. 1, 131, (1932) 270, 379, 481, 597.
258. INTERNATIONAL JURIDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURBING THE COURTS (1937). The newly
organized National Lawyers Guild has submitted to a vote of its membership various pro-
posals for dealing with the issues here considered, including a proposal to abolish altogether
the power of judicial review, N. Y. Times, July 31, 1937, p. 4, col. 8.
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new amendment. But even so, some Court of last resort inevitably will
remain, and if deprived of the power of declaring laws unconstitutional, it
will retain the power of interpreting them. Even now Congress often fails
to correct interpretations which have stirred the country, as when the "rule
of reason" emasculated the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. 259 No matter how
supreme the legislature may be, inertia or political shifts will often give the
Court the last word.
But, it is argued, it is bad enough that the country may not know for
a long time what a law means, but why should there also be the uncertainty
as to whether it ever was a valid law at all? This argument is a powerful
one, particularly in troubled times. A certain amount of governmental
paralysis no doubt exists during the period of challenge. That was notably
the situation while the Wagner Act cases wound their way to the Supreme
Court. Yet it should be possible to lessen the delay involved in obtaining a
decision from the Court.2 6 0 And, what is more important, it should also
be possible to reduce the area of doubt. Why may we not attempt a re-
defining of due process, a restoring of it to its original procedural mean-
ing? 261 If it prove necessary, why may we not extend Congressional power
over industry and agriculture? 262 Perhaps we should even deprive indi-
viduals of the right to question Congressional legislation 263 on the ground
that it invades power reserved to the states. And by all means let us simplify
the process of amending the Constitution, so that the people may be enabled
promptly to correct interpretations by the Supreme Court which run counter
to the considered views of the majority.
2 4
259. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U. S. 32 (1918) ; United States
v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920).
26o. Congress has just accomplished something in this direction by permitting direct ap-
peal to the Supreme Court. Delay might also be avoided by relieving the District Courts
of responsibility for passing on the law, at best a futile performance. See suggestion by
Fraenkel, Constituting Issues in the Supreme Court, 1935 Term (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv.
27, 78.
261. Any change in the due process clause should, however, be accompanied by an ex-
press prohibition against impairment by the states of various rights specified in the First
Amendment but now protected against infringement by the states only by virtue of the due
process clause, such as freedom of religion, of speech, of the press, and of assemblage. It
should be noted that the due process clause has been interpreted to include rights nowhere
specifically mentioned in the Constitution, such as the educational rights involved in Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925) ; and
Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U. S. 284 (1927). If it is desired to preserve these rights
some express formulation of them would be necessary.
262. Clark, Some Recent Proposals for Constitutional Amendment (1937) 12 Wis. L.
REV. 313, 322; Garrison, The Form of a Constitutional Amendment (937) 27 Am. LAB.
LEG. RLV. II.
263. And, for that matter, private persons might even be deprived of the right to contest
state laws, on the ground that they were infringing on federal power. For discussion of a
provision of this sort in a former Austrian Constitution see Grant, Judicial Review of Legis-
lation under the Austrian Constitution of z92o (1934) 28 Am. POL. SCi. REv. 670.
264. An amendment of this kind has been formulated by the author. Fraenkel, What
can be Done about the Constitution and the Supreme Court? (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 212,
225, n. 92.
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The advocates of Congressional supremacy should not forget that
majorities in Congress often get out of touch with their constituents, often
they are swayed by hysteria, and driven by the illusion of power. The
people, though also classic victims of hysteria, being further removed from
the exercise of power, are more likely to remember the value of restraints.
Each individual voter is, in some respects, a member of a minority group.
As such he may be more likely than Congress to heed the rights of minorities
when efforts are made to destroy them.
The assumption by some liberals that the abolition of judicial review
will permit the forward march toward the desired goal is naive. In a
country firmly united toward a progressive goal the power of judicial re-
view, if tempered as suggested, is not to be feared, and without such power
repressive and arbitrary acts of government would be much freer from
correction. For it is in the field of minority rights, of civil liberties, that
constitutional restraints have their greatest significance and judicial review
its real value. The people, who might not themselves sanction destruction
of liberties when faced with such an issue in a proposed constitutional
amendment, might yet tolerate in office an administration which, drunk
with power, impaired such liberties. Then power, without the possible
check imposed by judicial review, would tend to become irresponsible. Let
us remember that certain restraints upon government are wise and neces-
sary; that, though each of us may at times find himself restive under them,
he cannot tell when they, and courts to enforce them, will not stand between
him and arbitrary power. It took centuries of struggle to build these re-
straints into the legal structure. Let us not cast them lightly aside. To
curb the abuses of judicial review it is not necessary to burn down the house
of judgment.
